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Abstract: - For digital system designs, triple modular redundancy (TMR), which is a 3-tuple version of N-modular 
redundancy is widely preferred for many mission-control and safety-critical applications. The TMR scheme 
involves two-times duplication of the simplex system hardware, with a majority voter ensuring correctness 
provided at least two out of three copies of the system remain operational. Thus the majority voter plays a pivotal 
role in ensuring the correct operation of the system. The fundamental assumption implicit in the TMR scheme is 
that the majority voter does not become faulty, which may not hold well for implementations based on latest 
technology nodes with dimensions of the order of just tens of nanometers. To overcome the drawbacks of the 
classical majority voter some new voter designs were put forward in the literature with the aim of enhancing the 
fault tolerance. However, these voter designs generally ensure the correct system operation in the presence of 
either a faulty function module or the faulty voter, considered only in isolation. Since multiple faults may no 
longer be excluded in the nanoelectronics regime, simultaneous fault occurrences on both the function module 
and the voter should be considered, and the fault tolerance of the voters have to be analyzed under such a scenario. 
In this context, this article proposes a new fault-tolerant majority voter which is found to be more robust to faults 
than the existing voters in the presence of faults occurring internally and/or externally to the voter. Moreover, the 
proposed voter features less power dissipation, delay, and area metrics based on the simulation results obtained 
by using a 32/28nm CMOS process.              
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1 Introduction 
Design-for-reliability and fault-tolerant design have 
been identified as a major challenge for 
nanoelectronics designers by the Semiconductor 
Industry Association’s technology roadmap [1]. In 
this backdrop, fault-tolerant design assumes a greater 
significance in the nanoelectronics regime, where 
complicated technological issues such as random 
dopant (atomistic) fluctuations, sub-wavelength 
lithography, high heat flux, electro-migration, stress-
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induced variation, hot carrier effects, negative bias 
temperature instability, electrostatic discharge, line 
edge and line width roughness, process-induced 
defects, and metrology and manufacturing defects [2] 
[3] impact the manufacturing process. Although 
some of these technological issues existed at earlier 
technology nodes, they were less pronounced and 
were relatively easily dealt with. This is not the case 
at more recent technology nodes, where these issues 
tend to pose serious reliability problems for the 
design of fault-tolerant systems related to safety-
intensive applications such as space, aerospace, 
nuclear, defense, security, power, financial, medical, 
industrial control and automation, and global 
positioning and navigation systems.  
     Fault tolerance basically means guaranteeing the 
correct operation despite a fault occurrence, and thus 
signifies higher reliability. Occurrence of a fault 
internal or external to a function module1 should not 
affect the actual output of that function module. If 
this is ensured, then the fault occurring internally or 
externally is said to be masked or successfully hidden 
from being observed by the outside world. On the 
contrary, if the fault is not masked, it would affect the 
desired output expected from a function module 
causing an erroneous output to be produced instead 
of producing the correct output. Hence, faults which 
do not cause an error are said to be masked 
(concealed). On the other hand, faults that result in an 
error are said to be exposed (revealed). In short, the 
manifestation of a fault is construed to be an error [4].  
     Faults can be labelled as transient, intermittent or 
permanent [4]. Transient/temporary faults are also 
called as soft errors because they are correctable [5] 
– [8]. At the logic level, soft errors tend to get 
manifested as single-event effects [5]. Single-event 
transients (SETs), which occur due to high-energy 
particle strikes, might cause a bit-flip at a gate output 
node or in interconnects formed between logic 
elements. An SET possessing sufficient amplitude 
and duration may be captured by a state-holding 
element in the system stage and subsequently latched, 
resulting in an error called as single-event upset 
(SEU) [9]. SEU could also occur when a radiation 
phenomenon happens to directly flip the binary data 
output of a register or a memory element which 
immediately causes an error [10]. SEUs tend to affect 
data processing in the successive system stage due to 
permitting computation with erroneous data. 
However, the manifestation of a transient fault as an 
error depends upon the electrical, logical, and timing 
masking of the design [9] [11]. Transient faults can 
                                                 
1
 In this article, the term ‘function module’ is generically used to specify 
any circuit or system.  
be overcome through radiation hardening of 
underlying combinational and sequential logic and 
memory elements by employing redundancy [4] [28].  
     Intermittent faults [12] refer to those which are 
activated during certain times and are deactivated 
during other times, i.e. they occur randomly and 
might become permanent, for example, a loose 
electrical connection. Permanent faults are those 
which imply a physical defect or hardware failure, 
such as device shorts or opens, broken interconnect 
etc. which demand repair or replacement.  
     Permanent faults are generally modelled using 
stuck-at faults [4] [13]. There are two kinds of stuck-
at faults viz. stuck-at-1 (abbreviated as, s-a-1) and 
stuck-at-0 (abbreviated as, s-a-0). As the names 
imply, these faults specify that gate output nodes or 
interconnects might remain stuck-at the logic high 
state (i.e. binary 1) or stuck-at the logic low state (i.e. 
binary 0).There are two kinds of stuck-at faults: 
single stuck-at fault and multiple stuck-at faults. 
Single stuck-at fault presumes that a function module 
contains only one fault. The single stuck-at fault 
model may not suffice for nanoelectronics digital 
designs, which encounter greater variability and 
reliability issues, and so the usage of the multiple 
faults model is deemed more appropriate [14] [15].  
     The multiple stuck-at faults model acknowledges 
that two or more faults can occur at the same time in 
a function module. Moreover, the multiple stuck-at 
faults is classified as unidirectional and bidirectional: 
unidirectional, if all the stuck-at faults are of the same 
kind (i.e. s-a-0 or s-a-1); and bidirectional, if the 
stuck-at faults are different (i.e. s-a-0 and s-a-1 can 
co-exist). In this work, without loss of generality, 
potential transient and permanent faults that may 
possibly occur shall be represented using the 
notations 0→1 fault and 1→0 fault, introduced by 
Pierce in [16]. These notations are elegant in the 
sense that they can be used to concurrently model 
both transient as well as permanent faults. 0→1 and 
1→0 faults could imply bit-flips due to potential 
SETs signifying temporary faults, while in the 
context of permanent faults, 0→1 and 1→0 faults 
would indicate s-a-1 and s-a-0 faults respectively.  
     Radiation hardening by design is widely used to 
mitigate SETs and SEUs. With respect to radiation 
hardening by design, both circuit level and system 
level solutions exist. In the case of ASICs, one of the 
common circuit level solutions is to custom-develop 
radiation-tolerant cells which are meant for use in an 
ASIC-based design synthesis environment. 
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However, radiation-tolerant cell designs normally 
use extra transistors, adopt transistor sizing, and add 
extra capacitive loads to the output [17] – [20], and 
hence they potentially occupy more area, consume 
more power and may be slower in comparison with 
conventional standard cell libraries. The other viable 
alternative for designers is to adopt a well-established 
module level solution such as triple modular 
redundancy (TMR) [21] [29], which forms a subset 
of the N-modular redundancy scheme, where three 
identical function modules are used and a voter2 is 
used to produce a majority vote based on the outputs 
of correctly operating function modules.  
     The rest of this article is organized as follows. The 
fundamental TMR scheme is explained in Section 2, 
and its reliability is compared with that of a simplex 
system (i.e. non-redundant system) for various 
module reliabilities. The existing and proposed 
majority voter designs are presented and described in 
Section 3, and their fault tolerance are analyzed by 
considering single and multiple faults occurring 
internally and/or externally through a simple 
probabilistic fault analysis metric, proposed in this 
work. In Section 4, the design parameters viz. power, 
delay, and area of the different majority voters are 
estimated using a 32/28nm CMOS process and their 
respective fault tolerance are also tabulated. Finally, 
Section 5 concludes this article.  
 
 
2 TMR Scheme  
TMR is a generic method, which can be applied for 
combinational logic, sequential logic, memory cells, 
and routing elements, individually or in combinations 
in a digital design. Critics of TMR often point to the 
excess hardware overhead (about 200%) incurred. To 
minimize the hardware overhead, approaches for 
selective insertion of TMR have been proposed in the 
literature [22] – [25]. Selective application of TMR 
entails identification of critical circuit portions where 
TMR can be applied, and non-critical circuit portions 
where TMR may not be applied. Although not all 
errors tend to get eliminated through selective TMR 
insertion, the overall error rate however gets reduced 
[26]. Selective TMR introduction might serve as a 
feasible solution to alleviate the overheads of full 
TMR, especially for applications where weight, cost, 
and performance also matter besides fault tolerance, 
such as medical, mobile and portable electronics, and 
wearable electronics for military purposes. However 
                                                 
2
 Voter/majority voter in this paper, by default, refers to the 2-of-3 
majority voter used in TMR circuit/system architectures. 
3
 The faulty state of a function module may also imply its catastrophic 
failure state.  
for mission-critical systems, where reliability is 
paramount over cost, full TMR is preferred and has 
been chosen for many space and aerospace 
applications right from the design of Saturn V 
Launch Vehicle Digital Computer [27] to the in-
flight system design for the Mars Mission [28], and 
potentially even beyond.  
     TMR, which forms a subset of N-modular 
redundancy, requires two-times duplication of a 
function module and the three identical function 
modules are joined through a voting element as 
shown in Figure 1. In Figure 1, function modules 2 
and 3 are basically copies of the function module 1. 
X, Y and Z represent the corresponding (equivalent) 
outputs of function modules 1, 2 and 3, which form 
the primary inputs to the voter, whose output is 
labelled as V. If any arbitrary function module 
becomes faulty3, the TMR system will still continue 
to operate correctly on account of the Boolean 
majority, which is established by the voter through 
(1). In (1), product implies logical conjunction, and 
sum implies logical disjunction.  
 
V = XYZ + XY + YZ + XZ = XY + YZ + XZ            (1) 
 
     Equation (1) inherently assumes that the voter is 
perfect, i.e. the voter is not faulty. A perfect voter is 
associated with the ideal reliability value of RV4 = 1. 
Under this consideration, the reliability of the TMR 
system (RTMR) is expressed by (2), where the non-
faulty state of a function module is represented by 
RM, and its faulty state is denoted by (1 – RM). Since 
the function modules are identical, their reliabilities 
may also be assumed to be equal. The first term on 
the right hand side of (2) represents the condition 
when all the function modules are operating 
correctly, and the second term on the right hand side 
of (2) indicates a single function module fault, with 
the remaining function modules operating correctly.  
 
RTMR = RM3 + 3(1 – RM) RM2    (2) 
 
     The reliability of the simplex system containing 
just one function module as opposed to three 
equivalent function modules in a TMR architecture is 
specified as RSimplex = RM. Figure 2 shows a plot of 
module reliability (X-axis) versus corresponding 
system reliabilities (Y-axis) of simplex and TMR 
systems. It is clear from Figure 2 that up till RM < 0.5, 
the simplex system is more reliable than the TMR 
4
 The notation R is used to represent the reliability in this paper. 
Reliability is akin to probability and is a function of time (t). It is implicit 
in this paper that R = R (t) while referring to module or system 
reliabilities.   
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system, although not being fault-tolerant. RM = 0.5 
indicates the scenario when the reliabilities of the 
simplex and TMR systems become equal. However, 
assuming RM values to be less than 0.5 is very 
conservative in a practical scenario as usually 
function modules tend to have higher reliabilities 
close to 0.9 [4]. Hence for RM values greater than 0.5, 
it is evident from Figure 2 that the TMR system 
steadily outperforms the simplex system in terms of 
reliability besides being more fault-tolerant since the 
simplex system might become a single point-of-
failure [4] [30] during critical fault occurrences.  
 
 
Fig 1. Block diagram of the TMR scheme 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Comparison of reliabilities of simplex and 
TMR systems (in y-axis) versus module reliability 
(in x-axis) 
 
 
3 Majority Voters – Designs and Fault 
Tolerance Analysis  
Provided only one function module becomes 
faulty/fails out of three identical function modules in 
the TMR scheme, the majority voter is capable of 
successfully masking a single fault/failure from being 
noticed by the external environment and also 
manages to keep the entire system operational. 
However, it is generally presumed that no fault(s) can 
occur within the voter, which implies that the voter is 
assumed to be perfect. If this default assumption is 
challenged, the TMR system may meet with partial 
failure, i.e. producing correct outputs for only a 
subset of the given inputs, or worst might result in 
complete breakdown. It is important to note that an 
imperfect or faulty voter may wrongly indicate a 
system failure when the majority of the function 
modules are operating correctly, or may erroneously 
indicate the correct system operation when multiple 
function modules have indeed become faulty. Hence, 
besides considering the faulty conditions of function 
modules and the voter separately, faulty conditions of 
function modules and the voter also have to be 
considered simultaneously in order to exhaustively 
evaluate the fault tolerance capability of the voters. 
In this section, a number of voter circuits is presented 
and the possible scenarios for faulty/non-faulty 
conditions of the function module(s) vis-à-vis a 
perfect or imperfect voter behavior are illustrated to 
comprehensively evaluate the fault tolerance of 
different voter designs.  
 
3.1 Classical/Conventional Majority Voter – 
Fault Tolerance Analysis  
The classical voter [21] [29], shown in Figure 3, 
consists of three 2-input AND gates in the first level 
and a 3-input OR gate in the second level, which 
synthesizes (1). This voter shall be referred by the 
acronym, Classical_MV, for brevity. The acronym 
‘MV’ expands as ‘Majority Voter’ and shall be used 
in conjunction with the acronyms of various majority 
voters in this article. X, Y and Z represent the primary 
voter inputs, which signify the equivalent outputs of 
preceding and identical function modules. V 
represents the voter’s output which synthesizes (1). 
Note that the input and output labels viz. X, Y, Z, and 
V shall be uniformly maintained throughout this 
article for all the majority voter designs, and they 
shall not be repeated further.  
 
 
 
Fig 3. Classical majority voter 
 
     The labels N1, N2, N3 of the Classical_MV 
represent interconnects/internal output nodes of the 
first-level AND gates in Figure 3. Ideally, the 
function modules’ outputs viz. X, Y and Z which 
serve as the primary voter inputs are either 0s or 1s, 
0
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which are specified as the ‘no function module fault’ 
conditions in Tables 1 to 4. Note that any other input 
combination of X, Y and Z signifies ‘single/multiple 
function module faults’, as mentioned in Tables 1 to 
4. For example, when X, Y and Z are 0, 0 and 1, when 
they should have been all 0, it is indicative of a single 
function module fault. On the other hand, when X, Y 
and Z are 0, 0 and 1 when they are expected to have 
been 1, it represents multiple function module faults.  
     Table 1, shown in Appendix A, comprehensively 
depicts the truth-table of the majority voter shown in 
Figure 3 and also specifies the potential 
single/multiple faults that may occur internally 
within the voter in conjunction with faulty/fault-free 
function module outputs, and further, captures their 
subsequent impact on the voter’s output. Table 1 
additionally serves as a proxy for fault-injection and 
fault analysis. Hence the proposed ‘truth-cum-fault 
enumeration table’ (Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this work) 
which helps to perform the fault tolerance analysis 
forms an important contribution of this work. The 
binary bits shown in blackened boxes under the 
column ‘Internal voter outputs’ in Table 1 represents 
the correct values of internal nodes of the voter viz. 
N1, N2, and N3 for the applied primary inputs, and 
they signify the absence of any internal fault 
occurrence within the voter. The type of fault 
occurrence viz. 0→1 fault or 1→0 fault on internal 
nets N1, N2, and N3 is shown annotated in Table 1.  
     As seen in Table 1, there are many instances when 
the Classical_MV produces the correct output despite 
single or multiple function module faults/failures, 
and there are also a number of instances when the 
Classical_MV produces an erroneous output. For 
example, when the primary voter inputs are 111, 
expected internal outputs are 111 and the voter 
primary output is expected to be 1. Given this 
primary input combination, supposing internal output 
N1, N2 or N3 experiences a single 1→0 fault, this does 
not affect the primary output and the voter continues 
to maintain the correct state by masking the internal 
fault. However, for the same primary input 
combination, considering the pessimistic case of 
intermediate nodes N1, N2 and N3 all subject to a 1→0 
fault (multiple faults), the voter produces an 
erroneous output of 0.  
     To quantitatively evaluate the effect of probable 
internal voter fault(s) on the voter’s primary output, 
subject to a simultaneous consideration of 
faulty/fault-free condition of the function modules 
outputs, a probability-based fault metric viz. the fault 
masking ratio is proposed and is defined as follows:  
• Fault Masking Ratio (FMR) – Specified as the 
ratio of total number of correct voter output states 
in the presence of internal and/or external faults, 
which are masked, divided by the total number of 
potential internal and/or external fault 
occurrences 
 
     Uniform primary inputs distribution is considered 
throughout this work to simplify the fault tolerance 
analysis. Nonetheless, the definition of FMR can be 
modified to suit a practical scenario by expressing it 
as the ratio of total number of correct voter output 
states divided by the total number of likely internal 
and/or external faults corresponding to the applied 
primary inputs. FMR is in fact a measure of 
robustness against potential fault occurrences. From 
the definition given, it may be understood that FMR 
has to be high (ideally 1) to achieve good (absolute) 
fault tolerance. In general, if there is a possibility for 
p faults to occur, and if q out of p faults are 
successfully masked from being observed by the 
outside world, the maximum number of faults that 
would potentially be exposed to the outside world 
would be given by (p – q). Thus, (1 – FMR) would 
numerically signify the extent of fault exposure, 
which has to be low (ideally 0).  
     For evaluation, FMR pertaining to single and/or 
multiple faults shall henceforth be denoted by 
FMRS/MF. Referring to Table 1, FMR for the 
Classical_MV is estimated to be 0.4286, as per the 
definition. Since the Classical_MV tolerates less than 
50% of internal and/or external fault(s), it cannot be 
labelled as a good fault-tolerant design. This 
emphasizes the need for a voter design with improved 
fault tolerance.  
 
3.2 Kshirsagar and Patrikar Majority Voter – 
Fault Tolerance Analysis  
The priority encoding based voter proposed by 
Kshirsagar and Patrikar [31], henceforth identified as 
the KP_MV, is shown in Figure 4. Two 2-input XOR 
gates, a priority encoder that consists of an inverter 
and a 2-input AND gate as shown within the 
combinational cloud in dotted lines, and a 2:1 
multiplexer (MUX) constitute the KP_MV circuit. 
There are four internal nodes – N1, N2, N3 and P; and 
these present themselves as candidates for modelling 
of single/multiple internal faults.  
     Table 2, shown in Appendix B, portrays a partial 
truth-cum-fault enumeration of the KP_MV 
capturing the effect of just a single internal fault on 
the voter output, subject to single/multiple/no 
function module faults/failures. As in Table 1, the 
correct values of intermediate outputs are represented 
by the binary values shown in blackened boxes under 
the column ‘Internal voter outputs’. The remaining 
intermediate output values reflect the incorrect binary 
states due to the presence of only a single fault. When 
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both single and multiple faults which might occur 
inside the voter are considered in conjunction with 
single/multiple/no function module faults/failures, 
Table 2 will comprise a total of 128 listings, which 
would indeed be numerous to mention here. Hence, 
only single internal faults are enumerated bit-wise in 
Table 2 along with an annotation of the type of fault 
occurrence. Enumeration of multiple faults within the 
voter can be done in a similar manner as discussed 
for the Classical_MV, and this is left to the reader.  
 
 
 
Fig 4. Kshirsagar and Patrikar majority voter 
 
     The KP_MV is guaranteed to be fault-proof only 
in the presence of a single fault occurring internally 
or externally. However, when a function module 
becomes faulty/fails and the voter also develops an 
internal fault, the KP_MV may or may not be fault-
tolerant as can be seen in Table 2. For example, when 
the voter inputs are 0, 1 and 1, and simultaneously if 
any of the internal nodes becomes faulty, the voter 
output would be corrupted. When the voter inputs are 
1, 0 and 1, and even if any internal node might 
become faulty, the KP_MV tends to mask the faults. 
On the other hand, when multiple internal faults 
occur within the KP_MV, it may cease to be fault-
tolerant. Let us now consider two cases for 
illustration.  
 When the primary inputs X, Y and Z are all 1’s, 
internal outputs N1, N2, N3 and P would attain 
binary values of 0, 0, 1 and 0 respectively and the 
voter output would correctly evaluate to 1. Under 
this condition, if any of N1, N2, N3 and P becomes 
faulty, the voter retains the correct output of 1, 
thereby the internal fault is successfully masked  
 With the primary inputs X, Y and Z now being 1, 
1 and 0 respectively, internal outputs N1, N2, N3 
and P would attain binary values of 0, 1, 0 and 0 
and the voter output would evaluate to 1 since the 
majority of the inputs is 1. Under this scenario, if 
the intermediate node P experiences a fault, the 
voter would tend to produce an erroneous output 
of 0, thereby violating the majority convention 
 
     From Table 2, and based on the exhaustive 
consideration of single/multiple internal faults 
occurring within the voter in conjunction with the 
faulty (failure)/non-faulty (non-failure) states of the 
function modules, the FMR of the KP_MV is 
calculated to be 0.7083. Comparing the FMRs of 
KP_MV and the Classical_MV, it is clear that the 
former is more fault-tolerant than the latter by 65.3%. 
Nevertheless, the KP_MV tends to expose roughly 
30% of the faults to the external environment and also 
features more number of gates, which results in 
degradation of the design metrics, as substantiated in 
Section 4.  
 
3.3 Ban and Naviner Majority Voter – Fault 
Tolerance Analysis  
Ban and Naviner [32] presented a voter circuit 
portrayed by Figure 5 which shall henceforth be 
referred to as BN_MV for brevity. The BN_MV 
consists of just two gates – a 2-input XOR gate and a 
2:1 MUX. Primary inputs X and Y of the voter are 
XORed and given as the select input for the 2:1 
MUX. If the select input is 0, then input Y will be 
selected and its value will be forwarded to the voter 
output V. However if the select input is 1, the voter 
input Z will be reflected on the voter’s output. N 
represents the internal node in Figure 5.  
 
 
 
Fig 5. Ban and Naviner majority voter 
 
     The BN_MV, similar to the KP_MV, is 
guaranteed to be fault-proof only when a single fault 
occurs internally or externally. When a function 
module fails at random and the voter also develops 
an internal fault simultaneously, the BN_MV may 
cease to be fault-tolerant. This is clarified through 
Table 3, given as Appendix C, which captures all the 
potential faults that might occur with respect to the 
internal node N, corresponding to single/multiple/no 
function module faults. Let us now consider two 
sample cases to ascertain when the BN_MV tends to 
be fault-tolerant and when it ceases to be so.  
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 When the primary inputs X, Y and Z are 0, 1 and 
1, the intermediate node N evaluates to 1 and the 
voter’s primary output V also evaluates to 1, since 
Z is reflected as the voter output. At this juncture, 
if N is subject to a 1→0 fault, the primary input Y 
will be selected by the 2:1 MUX and the value of 
Y which is the same as that of Z will be reflected 
as the output. Thus, in this case, the BN_MV 
maintains the correct operation despite an internal 
and external fault occurrence 
 On the other hand, if X, Y and Z are 1, 0 and 1, N 
is computed as 1 which implies that input Z is 
selected by the 2:1 MUX and the voter outputs the 
value of Z which is 1. Given this input scenario, 
supposing N experiences a 1→0 fault, primary 
input Y will be selected by the MUX resulting in 
the voter’s output V getting corrupted 
 
     Fault tolerance analysis of the BN_MV can be 
performed based on the data given in Table 3. As in 
Tables 1 and 2, the correct values of intermediate 
outputs are indicated by the binary values shown in 
blackened boxes under the column ‘Internal voter 
outputs’. The remaining internal output values reflect 
the incorrect binary states due to fault occurrence(s). 
From Table 3, FMRS/MF of the BN_MV is calculated 
to be 0.5. This implies the BN_MV allows 50% of 
the internal and/or external faults to corrupt the 
primary output. In comparison with the conventional 
voter, the BN_MV is more fault-tolerant by 16.7%. 
But compared to the KP_MV, the BN_MV tolerates 
29.4% less faults though it has a more compact 
physical realization. This is substantiated by the 
design metrics given in Section 4.  
 
3.4 Proposed Majority Voter – Design and 
Fault Tolerance Analysis  
The proposed majority voter (Proposed_MV) is 
shown in Figure 6, which consists of only two gates 
viz. G1, which is a 2-input OR gate, and G2, which 
is a complex gate that implements the Boolean 
function V = MZ + XY + YZ, where M = X + Y is 
the internal output. The Proposed_MV is identical to 
the BN_MV in that it too features a single internal 
node. However the Proposed_MV helps to pave the 
way for improved resilience to potential internal 
and/or external fault(s).  
     Table 4, given in Appendix D, captures the truth-
cum-fault enumerations of the Proposed_MV. As in 
the previous Tables, the correct values of 
intermediate outputs are indicated by the binary 
values shown in blackened boxes under the column 
‘Internal voter outputs’. The remaining internal 
output values reflect the incorrect binary states due to 
fault occurrences. From Table 4, it can be seen that 
the Proposed_MV copes with all but one instance of 
single and multiple function module faults/failures 
despite the occurrence of any internal fault within it. 
Hence, with the exception of the two cases where the 
voter inputs could assume binary values of 001 or 
101, and an internal fault may also occur 
simultaneously within the voter, the proposed 
majority voter is able to mask all other fault 
scenario(s) that might occur internally and/or 
externally. Thus the FMRS/MF of Proposed_MV is 
high and is calculated to be 0.75.  
 
 
 
Fig 6. Proposed majority voter 
 
 
4 Simulation Results and Discussion  
The different majority voters discussed so far were 
implemented in semi-custom ASIC design style 
using the 32/28nm digital standard cell library [33]. 
The voters were described according to the respective 
gate-level schematics shown, and their structural 
integrity was preserved during technology-mapping. 
This paves the way for a straightforward comparison 
of the design metrics of different majority voters 
subsequent to their physical implementation.  
     Minimum sized gates were chosen uniformly for 
all the majority voter designs and a typical-case PVT 
specification was considered with the recommended 
supply voltage of 1.05V and operating junction 
temperature of 25°C. Further, wire loads (i.e. 
parasitic) were included automatically whilst 
performing the simulations using Synopsys tools. All 
the primary voter outputs were assigned with fanout-
of-4 drive strength. More than 1000 random input 
vectors corresponding to a diverse sequencing of 
primary input patterns were applied to the voters at 
time intervals of 1ns (i.e., 1 GHz) through test 
benches to capture their switching activities, and the 
.vcd files thus obtained were subsequently used for 
average power estimation using Synopsys 
PrimeTime. The time-based power analysis mode 
was used to accurately estimate the average power 
dissipation of the voters. The voters’ delay and area 
were also estimated. The power, delay, area, and 
FMR of the voters are given in Table 5.    
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     For a combined evaluation of the fault tolerance 
and design parameters viz. power, delay and area of 
the different majority voters, a new fault tolerance 
included figure-of-merit viz. FT-FOM is proposed. 
FT-FOM is specified as a numerical entity, which is 
computed as the product of FMRS/MF (in percent) and 
the figure of merit (FOM), where FOM is specified 
as the inverse of the product of power, delay, and area 
(PDAP-1). It has already been shown in [34] – [39] 
that FOM is a useful measure to quantify the physical 
attributes of a digital design. Since it is desirable to 
minimize the power, delay, and area metrics, a lower 
PDAP value and thus a higher FOM are desirable. 
Moreover, it is desirable to maximize the FMR for 
achieving enhanced fault tolerance. Hence, a high 
value of FT-FOM can be considered to be a good 
indicator of fault tolerance and design performance 
simultaneously. The calculated FT-FOM values are 
portrayed in Figure 7.     
 
Table 5. Average power dissipation, maximum 
propagation delay, area occupancy, and FMR of 
different majority voters 
Type of  
voter  
Power  
(µW) 
Delay  
(ns) 
Area  
(µm2) 
FMR 
(%) 
Classical_MV 3.52 0.13 8.39 42.86 
KP_MV 6.29 0.30 15.25 70.83 
BN_MV 3.49 0.22 7.62 50 
Proposed_MV 1.88 0.17 5.34 75 
 
     It can be seen in Figure 7 that the KP_MV has the 
least FT-FOM as a direct consequence of its higher 
power dissipation, more propagation delay, and large 
Silicon area occupancy. The propagation delay of the 
KP_MV is high as it features more number of logic 
levels in comparison with the other voters. Since the 
KP_MV also has more number of logic elements than 
the other voters, it occupies more area and 
consequently dissipates more power. Although the 
FMR of the KP_MV is better than other voter designs 
and is only less than the FMR of the proposed voter 
by 5.6%, its FT-FOM is the least among all the voter 
designs. Though the Classical_MV has the least FMR 
amongst all the voters, its FT-FOM is indeed greater 
than the FT-FOM of KP_MV by 3.5×. This is 
because the Classical_MV has optimized design 
metrics compared to the KP_MV. The BN_MV, on 
the other hand, has an enhanced FMR of 14.3% than 
the Classical_MV, but the latter has an improved FT-
FOM of 30.6% compared to the former. On account 
of less area occupancy, less power dissipation, less 
propagation delay, and enhanced FMR, the 
Proposed_MV reports significantly higher FT-FOM 
than all the other voter designs viz. Classical_MV, 
KP_MV and BN_MV by 2.9×, 16.9× and 4.1× 
respectively. Additionally, the peak power 
dissipation of the voters was estimated and it was 
found that the Proposed_MV has the least peak 
power dissipation of 145.2µW amongst all the other 
voter designs, with the Classical_MV, KP_MV, and 
BN_MV reporting high peak power dissipations of 
176.5µW, 289.7µW, and 234.7µW respectively. The 
Proposed_MV requires only 18 transistors for 
physical implementation in static CMOS style after 
logic factoring [40] through logic optimization. It 
was shown in [41] that pre-logic factoring followed 
by physical synthesis could in fact pave the way for 
optimization of the design metrics.     
 
 
 
Fig 7. FT-FOM of various voters. X-axis: Voter 
type; Y-axis: FT-FOM numeric value – a high value 
of FT-FOM implies high fault masking capability 
and design efficiency 
 
 
5 Conclusions  
The TMR scheme has been widely adopted for 
numerous mission-control and safety-critical systems 
applications at both hardware and software levels. At 
the hardware level, TMR has been predominantly 
sought after for the fault-tolerant design of ASIC and 
FPGA based function modules, and all TMR 
architectures inherently incorporate the majority 
logic (i.e., the majority voter) to guarantee the correct 
operation despite a function module fault/failure.  
     This article has presented different TMR-based 
majority voter designs, and their realization using a 
cutting-edge 32/28nm CMOS technology. The fault 
tolerance viz. fault masking capability of the different 
majority voter designs has been extensively analyzed 
by considering the occurrence of single/multiple 
internal and/or external faults through the truth-cum-
fault enumeration table, newly proposed in this work.  
     It may be noted that the proposed truth-cum-fault 
enumeration table can be extended to evaluate the 
fault tolerance property of any digital logic design. 
Previous related works in the literature have put 
forward majority voter designs viz. KP_MV and 
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BN_MV, which have better fault tolerance than the 
classical voter, but these voters are primarily 
designed to cope with only a single fault occurring 
internally/externally, and cannot withstand multiple 
faults/failures that may occur internally and/or 
externally to the majority voter. With multiple faults 
becoming common in the era of nanoelectronics, 
their consideration is deemed important and this has 
been analyzed at length in this work.  
     Further, this article has presented a new majority 
voter design which features improved fault tolerance 
than the previously proposed majority voter designs 
with respect to both single and multiple faults 
occurring internally and/or externally to the voter. A 
new fault analysis metric, called FMR, was also 
proposed and used to quantify the fault tolerance of 
different majority voters when subject to 
single/multiple fault(s) occurring internally and/or 
externally, and the proposed majority voter exhibits 
enhanced FMR than the rest. The estimation of 
standard design parameters viz. power, delay, and 
area of the different majority voters has also been 
done based on a 32/28nm CMOS technology. The 
fault tolerance analysis and the simulations indicate 
that the proposed voter achieves superior FMR and 
quality-of-results (FOM) simultaneously.    
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APPENDIX A 
 
PART I of Table 1. Truth-cum-fault enumeration table of Classical_MV portraying the effect of internal 
and/or external faults on the voter output 
Primary voter  
inputs 
Internal voter  
outputs 
Primary voter 
output 
Voter output  
state 
(Actual/Correct/Error) X Y Z N1 N2 N3 V 
No function module fault/failure 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
0 0 0 0 Actual 
0 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
1 
0 0 0 0 Actual 
0 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
0 
0 0 0 0 Actual 
0 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
0 1 0 1 Actual 
0 0 (1→0) 0 0 Error 
0 0 (1→0) 1 (0→1) 1 Correct  
0 1 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 0 (1→0) 0 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 0 (1→0) 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 1 0 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 1 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
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PART II of Table 1. Truth-cum-fault enumeration table of Classical_MV portraying the effect of 
internal and/or external faults on the voter output 
Primary voter  
inputs 
Internal voter  
outputs 
Primary voter 
output 
Voter output  
state 
(Actual/Correct/Error) X Y Z N1 N2 N3 V 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
0 
0 0 0 0 Actual 
0 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 0 1 Error 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
1 
0 0 1 1 Actual 
0 0 0 (1→0) 0 Error 
0 1 (0→1) 0 (1→0) 1 Correct  
0 1 (0→1) 1 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 0 0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 0 1 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 1 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
0 
1 0 0 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 0 0 0 Error 
0 (1→0) 0 1 (0→1) 1 Correct  
0 (1→0) 1 (0→1) 0 1 Correct 
0 (1→0) 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
1 0 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
1 1 (0→1) 0 1 Correct 
1 1 (0→1) 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
No function module fault/failure 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
1 
1 1 1 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 0 (1→0) 0 (1→0) 0 Error 
0 (1→0) 0 (1→0) 1 1 Correct  
0 (1→0) 1 0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
0 (1→0) 1 1 1 Correct 
1 0 (1→0) 0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
1 0 (1→0) 1 1 Correct 
1 1 0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
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APPENDIX B 
 
PART I of Table 2. Partial truth-cum-fault enumeration table of KP_MV, highlighting the effect of 
single internal fault on the voter output in the presence of single/multiple/no function module 
faults/failure 
Primary 
voter  
inputs 
Internal  
voter  
outputs 
Primary  
voter  
output 
Voter  
output   
state 
(Actual/Correct/Error) X Y Z N1 N2 N3 P V 
No function module fault/failure 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
0 0 1 0 0 Actual 
0 0 0 (1→0) 0 0 Correct 
0 0 1 1 (0→1) 0 Correct 
0 1 (0→1) 0 0 0 Correct 
1 (0→1) 0 1 1 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
0 1 0 0 0 Actual 
0 1 0 1 (0→1) 1 Error 
0 1 1 (0→1) 0 0 Correct 
0 0 (1→0) 1 0 0 Correct 
1 (0→1) 1 0 0 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
1 1 0 0 0 Actual 
1 1 0 1 (0→1) 0 Correct 
1 1 1 (0→1) 1 0 Correct 
0 (1→0) 1 0 0 0 Correct 
1 0 (1→0) 1 1 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
1 0 1 1 1 Actual 
1 0 0 (1→0) 0 0 Error 
1 0 1 0 (1→0) 0 Error 
1 1 (0→1) 0 0 0 Error 
0 (1→0) 0 1 0 0 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
0 
1 0 1 1 0 Actual 
1 0 0 (1→0) 0 1 Error 
1 0 1 0 (1→0) 1 Error 
0 (1→0) 0 1 0 1 Error 
1 1 (0→1) 0 0 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
1 1 0 0 1 Actual 
1 1 0 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
1 1 1 (0→1) 1 1 Correct 
1 0 (1→0) 1 1 1 Correct 
0 (1→0) 1 0 0 1 Correct 
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PART II of Table 2. Partial truth-cum-fault enumeration table of KP_MV, highlighting the effect of 
single internal fault on the voter output in the presence of single/multiple/no function module 
faults/failure 
Primary 
voter  
inputs 
Internal  
voter  
outputs 
Primary  
voter  
output 
Voter  
output   
state 
(Actual/Correct/Error) X Y Z N1 N2 N3 P V 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
0 
0 1 0 0 1 Actual 
0 1 0 1 (0→1) 0 Error 
0 1 1 (0→1) 0 1 Correct 
0 0 (1→0) 1 0 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 1 0 0 1 Correct 
No function module fault/failure 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
 
 
1 
0 0 1 0 1 Actual 
0 0 0 (1→0) 0 1 Correct 
0 0 1 1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
0 1 (0→1) 0 0 1 Correct 
1 (0→1) 0 1 1 1 Correct 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
PART I of Table 3. Truth-cum-fault enumeration table of BN_MV, capturing the effect of internal 
and/or external faults on the voter output 
Primary  
voter inputs 
Internal voter  
output 
Primary  
voter output 
Voter output  
state 
(Actual/Correct/Error) X Y Z N V 
No function module fault/failure 
0 0 0 0 0 Actual 
1 (0→1) 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
0 0 1 0 0 Actual 
1 (0→1) 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
0 1 0 1 0 Actual 
0 (1→0) 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
0 1 1 1 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
1 0 0 1 0 Actual 
0 (1→0) 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
1 0 1 1 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 0 Error 
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 PART II of Table 3. Truth-cum-fault enumeration table of BN_MV, capturing the effect of internal 
and/or external faults on the voter output 
Primary  
voter inputs 
Internal voter  
output 
Primary  
voter output 
Voter output  
state 
(Actual/Correct/Error) X Y Z N V 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
1 1 0 0 1 Actual 
1 (0→1) 0 Error 
No function module fault/failure 
1 1 1 0 1 Actual 
1 (0→1) 1 Correct 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
Table 4. Truth-cum-fault enumeration table of Proposed_MV showing the effect of internal and/or 
external faults on the voter output 
Primary  
voter inputs 
Internal voter  
output 
Primary  
voter output 
Voter output 
state 
(Actual/Correct/Error) X Y Z M V 
No function module fault/failure 
0 0 0 0 0 Actual 
1 (0→1) 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
0 0 1 0 0 Actual 
1 (0→1) 1 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
0 1 0 1 0 Actual 
0 (1→0) 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
0 1 1 1 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
1 0 0 1 0 Actual 
0 (1→0) 0 Correct 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
1 0 1 1 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 0 Error 
Single/multiple function module faults/failures 
1 1 0 1 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
No function module fault/failure 
1 1 1 1 1 Actual 
0 (1→0) 1 Correct 
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